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Abstract:  There are important 
challenges to the grain handling and 
shipping industries.  The study 
evaluated changes in marketing costs 
for the primary grain marketing functions 
and quantified measures of risk.  The 
results indicate that 1) basis risk has 
increased; 2) all marketing costs have 
increased; 3) the increase in rail tariffs 
were less than those for the other 
modes; 4) car values, on average 
declined; 5) FSC’s had moderate 
changes in absolute terms; 6) handling 
margins have had fairly substantial 
increases, particularly at port; and 7) the 
riskiness in rail shipping costs are less 
than those of competing modes and 
functions.  The regression model 
indicated the following variables had 
significant impacts on origin basis 
values:  shipping costs, ocean rate 
spreads, outstanding export sales, 
handling industry concentration, 
measures of rail cars late, the ratio of 
supplies to storage capacity, futures 
prices and spreads (in addition to a few 
other minor impacts). 
 
Introduction: Numerous changes are 
occurring in world agriculture which are 
having dramatic impacts on the 
international and domestic shipping 
industries.  One of the results is that the 
basis has become more volatile 
resulting in more risk for producers and 
shippers, and exacerbates planning and 
investment for handling and shipping 
infrastructure.  These are important 
challenges to the handling and shipping 
industries, in addition to understanding 
the role of transportation on basis 
relationships and grain pricing.  The 
purpose of this study is to analyze 
relationships and impacts between 
shipping costs and basis values at 
origins and destinations.
1   
 
Data Description and Behavior:  A 
detailed set of data was developed to 
analyze intermarket basis relationships, 
and how shipping costs impact these 
relationships.  Weekly data were used 
from 2004-2009 for soybeans and 2004-
August 2010 for corn.  Selected results 
                                                       
1 Several studies have recently analyzed 
issues related to rail and grain pricing.  These 
include the USDA (2010), and studies on 
soybeans (O’Neil Commodity Consulting, 2010), 
corn (Informa Economics, 2010) and wheat 




from these data are summarized below 
and then we describe the major results. 
   
Rail rates, ancillary costs and 
performance: Tariff rates are shown for 
illustration for a North Dakota origin in 
Figure 1.  Rate changes are fairly 
periodic and changes retained for more 
extended periods (versus barge and 
ocean rates).   
 
Fuel Service Charges (FSC) An 
important element of the cost of 
shipping is the FSC (Figure 2).
2   These 
have increased from a low of less than 
$0.05/bu. in 2004, to a peak of $0.35-
0.45/bu. in 2008.  Since then, they 
declined to the $0.15-0.25/bu. range.  
 
Figure 1.  Tariff Rates for Rail 
Shipment of Soybeans from a ND 




                                                       
2 FSC’s have been adopted on all Class I 
railroads, and the application of each carriers 
policy varies.  That for the BNSF is shown here, 
but, it is important that that policy is in the 
process of change (Sterk, 2010, p.24.). 
 
Figure 2.  Fuel Service Charges for 
Rail Shipment of Soybeans from a ND 
origin to Ports, 2004-2010. 
 
Car values There are two mechanisms 
for pricing rail car values.  One is from 
the primary auctions.  These are results 
of the original BNSF weekly auction at 
which the initial allocation of shuttle 
shipments are allocated among bidders.  
The other is what is frequently referred 
as the secondary car market.  Which are 
available for nearby shipping periods, 
deferred periods, longer-periods, as well 
as varying periods forward.  A distinction 
that is important between these is that 
the results of the primary auction are 
revenues paid to the railroad.  
Secondary market values are a source 
of income (or loss) to the bidder that 
obtained the allocation in the primary 
market.   
   A couple of important points are 
reflected in this data (Figures 3-4).  
First, the vast majority (>90%) of 
primary car auctions are at nil premium.  
Initial buyers (shippers) were capable of 
attaining shuttle car commitments for 
near nil premiums.   The results indicate 
that freight availability is guaranteed 
























































mechanism) at virtually nil premiums in 
the primary market.   
Secondary market values are much 
more risky.  This is an important source 
of risk accrued by grain marketers.  On 
average, these are near nil.  The 
distribution is skewed meaning that the 
mechanism rewards the original 
certificate holder for accruing the 
obligations of the instrument. 
Figure 3.  Primary Car Values ($/car), 
2004-2010. 
Figure 4.  Secondary Car Values 
($/car), 2004-2010. 
 
Rail Car Performance:  Data exist at 
least on some carriers for on-time 
placement performance.  Data on on-
time performance from the BNSF 
indicates the average number of cars 
past due ranged from 1000 to 5000 for 
periods in 2004 and 2005.  Since then, 
performance spiked in 2006 and 2008 
and has improved with number of cars 
past due dropping to low values for 
much of late 2008, 2009 and 2010.
3 
Grain Pricing:  Though grain pricing 
has traditionally been thought to be 
simply the terminal cash price less rail 
rates, it has become much more 
complicated in a number of dimensions 
that prevail in more contemporary grain 
marketing.  Most important are impacts 
of multiple competing markets, and 
impacts of multiple elements in shipping 
costs.   
 
Basis Values:   
 
Origin Basis Values: Figures 5 and 6 
show the average basis across all 
origins for soybeans and corn 
respectively.  For soybeans, the basis is 
a larger negative value for stations in 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
western Nebraska.  Basis values are 
highest for stations located near the 
river including Illinois, Indiana and Ohio.  
The geographic dispersion in the basis 
is not as great for corn.  Basis values 
are the most negative for North Dakota, 
but not as negative as in the case of 
soybeans.   
 
                                                       
3   In summarizing rail performance during the 
fall of 2010, Fatka, (2010b) indicated rail 
loadings for grain were the highest since 2007 
and “agricultural shippers ranked BNSF and UP 
with highest service…  The important issue is 
that of trying to ship a very large crop in very 
short period………”  The operating performance 
during fall 2010 demonstrated that some 
railroads, “particularly BNSF and UP, have been 
more strategic in planning and more prudent in 















































































Figure 5.  Soybean Average Origin 
Basis Values, Average 2004-2009 
Figure 6.  Corn Average Origin Basis 
Values, Average 2004-2010. 
 
Figures 7 and 8 show the time series of 
basis at selected origins for a North 
Dakota origin, for illustration.  Soybean 
basis were in the $-0.50/bu. range, 
though quite volatile in 2004.  Then, the 
basis began a longer term decline 
reaching lows of $-1.70/bu. in July 2007 
and April 2008.  Following these 
periods, the basis has increased to 
more normal levels at about $-0.50/bu., 
though as apparent is quite volatile.  
  The corn basis behaved somewhat 
similarly.  Values in 2004 were in the 
range of $-0.10 to $-0.20/bu.  Basis then 
declined moderately to the $-0.10 to     
$-0.40/bu. range in 2005 through 2007.  
In 2008, it declined to a low of              
$-0.80/bu. and remained there from 
about May through September 2008.  
Following that the basis jumped back to 
the more normal levels of $-0.20 to      
$-0.40/bu.  The latter period remained a 
bit more volatile with a sharp downward 
spike in early 2010.   
Destination Basis (Figures 9-10).  For 
soybeans the basis has been quite 
variable.  In 2004 the basis was about 
$+0.50 at the PNW, but then it spiked to 
about $+1.75/bu.  It then moderated 
downward through 2007 and into 2008 
reaching lows.  After 2008, the basis 
has been increasing at both markets.  In 
late 2009, the basis spiked at New 
Orleans (NOLA) and went to a premium 
to the Pacific Northwest (PNW), at about 
$+1.50/bu.  It is also apparent these 
basis values have become more volatile 
in recent years. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.  Soybean Origin Basis for a 
ND origin 2004-2009. 
Figure  8.  Corn Origin Basis for a ND 
origin 2004-2010. 
The corn basis (Figure 10) was in the 
$0.75/bu. range in 2004.  It increased 
sharply in later 2007 and remained there 
through 2008, falling sharply in early 
2009.  Since then, the PNW basis has 
increased a bit more than that at the US 







Figure 9.  Soybean Destination Basis, 
by Destination, 2004-2009. 
 
Figure 10.  Corn Destination Basis by 
Destination, 2004-2010. 
 
  These data were used to derive the 
implied fobbing margins at ports.  There 
are several interesting observations.  
First, the margin at the PNW is clearly 
greater than that to the US Gulf.  
Second, margins are particularly 
volatile.  And, third, there was a notable 
increase in the margin through this 
period.  In 2004 margins were typically 
about $0.10 to 0.20/bu.  Over time, 
these escalated up to $1.00/bu. at the 
PNW during 2008.  During that same 
period, the US Gulf margin was lesser.  
The fobbing margin for corn at the US 
Gulf increased from $0.04/bu. to about 
$0.40/bu. in 2010.  Comparable values 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































typical values in 2007 at about $0.20/bu. 
to values in 2010 at about $0.40 to 
$0.60/bu. In more recent periods during 
later 2010, margins have been 
escalating.  
 
The data were used to derive 
measures of risk related to basis 
changes.  Results show that the 
soybean basis had a high degree of risk 
in 2004.  It was less than $0.10/bu. in 
2005-2007.  Since then, it increased to 
$0.20/bu. in 2008, and increased to over 
$0.30/bu. in 2009.  The destination 
basis is more volatile. 
 
Implied Margins  The data were 
transformed to derive the margin for 
each origin and commodity which 
should be interpreted as the implied 
margin associated with handling and 
trading for net of shipping costs for 
shipments to the specified market that 
yields the maximum net return.  We 
show the results for one representative 
origin (Figure 11-12).  The margin for 
soybeans case increased from about 
$0.20/bu. to about $0.50/bu.  For corn, 
the margin is more volatile and 
increased from values in the $0.20/bu. 
range in 2004 to more recent 













Figure 11.  Soybean Margins, Total 
Shipping Costs, Rail Tariff, FSC and 
DCV, 2004-2009. 
Figure 12.  Corn  Margins, Total 
Shipping Costs, Rail Tariff, FSC and 
DCV, 2004-2010. 
Changes in Values:  Total Shipping 
Costs and Changes in values from 
2004 to 2009/10:  The data was used to 
evaluate changes over the periods since 
2004.  See Table 1.  Results from these 
data suggest a number of important 
observations: 
 
Basis, spreads and farm price ratios:  
The average origin basis declined by 
$0.17 and $0.18/bu., respectively for 
corn and soybeans and the average 
destination basis increased by $0.40 
and $0.23/bu.  These changes are 
important and indicate that while 






























































































































































































greater impact on increases in prices to 
buyers versus growers.   
The ratio of farm price to destination 
market price is a measure frequently 
used to describe efficiency in grain 
marketing.  The average farm price ratio 
for soybeans decreased from 91 to 90% 
of the destination market value.  For 
corn, the average farm price ratio 
decreased from 77 to 73%.   
 
Shipping costs:  Barge shipping costs 
increased by 41% and 33%, 
respectively for soybeans and corn.  
Rail tariff increases were less at 25% 
and 36%, respectively.  Importantly, 
there has been greater volatility or risk 
in barge and ocean shipping, than in 
rail.  Standard deviations for barge rates 
were in the area of $0.14/bu., and 
increased to $0.21/bu.  In contrast, the 
standard deviation for rail was less at 
$0.05/bu. for soybeans, and  $0.13/bu. 
for corn.    
 
Elements of rail shipping costs:  There 
are three elements of rail shipping costs 
and  include the rail tariff, the FSC and 
the daily car value.  For soybeans, the 
changes were:  rail tariff increased 
$0.20/bu.; car values decreased by 
$0.05/bu.; and FSC increased $0.10/bu.  
For corn, the changes were:  rail tariff 
+$0.24/bu.; car values $-0.03/bu.; and 
FSC increased $0.16/bu.  The standard 
deviations for these are relatively 
modest and less than that for the other 
modes.   
 
Implied margins:  For soybeans, the 
implied margin increased from $0.18 to 
$0.26/bu., or, by 47%.  For corn, the 
comparable margin increased from 
$0.15 to $0.39/bu., or by 164 percent.  
 
  For corn, we also derived the implied 
fobbing margin at each port.  That for 
the PNW increased from $0.16 to 
$0.36/bu., and that for the US Gulf 
increased from $0.04 to $0.24/bu., or, 
by 129% and 533%, respectively.  
 
  Taken together these results indicate 
that 1) all marketing costs have 
increased; 2) the increase in rail tariffs 
were less than those for the other 
modes; 3)  car values, on average 
declined;  4) FSC’s had moderate 
changes in absolute terms; and 5) 
handling margins have had fairly 
substantial increases, particularly at 
port.   
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Table 1.  Soybeans: Change in Shipping Costs and Values, 2004-2009.   
 
Mean $/bu.  Change   Std. Dev. 
   2004  2009  $/bu.  %  2004  2009 
Origin Basis  -0.08  -0.26  -0.18  -228%  0.34  0.40 
Dest. Basis  0.60  0.83  0.23  37%  0.26  0.30 
Spread  0.69  1.09  0.40  58%  0.36  0.51 
Farm Ratio  0.91  0.90  -0.01  -1%  0.06  0.05 
         
   
Barge Cost  0.28  0.40  0.12  41%  0.14  0.14 
Ocean Rate Gulf   1.60  1.28  -0.32  -20%  0.24  0.29 
Ocean Rate PNW  1.03  0.68  -0.35  -34%  0.15  0.16 
Ocean Spread  0.57  0.60  0.03  5%  0.13  0.14 
         
   
Rail Tariff  0.80  1.01  0.20  25%  0.05  0.04 
DCV  0.03  -0.02  -0.05  -153%  0.07  0.05 
FSC  0.04  0.14  0.10  240%  0.02  0.03 
Rail Shipping Cost  0.88  1.12  0.25  28%  0.12  0.07 
         
   
Margin  0.18  0.26  0.08  47%  0.33  0.38 
 
Corn:  Change in Shipping costs and values, 2004-2010  
  
Origin Basis  -0.15  -0.32  -0.17  -108%  0.13  0.18 
Dest. Basis  0.56  0.95  0.40  71%  0.24  0.34 
Spread  0.71  1.28  0.57  80%  0.31  0.46 
Farm Ratio  0.77  0.73  -0.04  -5%  0.10  0.08 
         
   
Barge Cost  0.25  0.34  0.08  33%  0.14  0.21 
Ocean Ship Gulf  1.50  1.74  0.24  16%  0.22  0.07 
Ocean Ship PNW  0.96  1.00  0.04  4%  0.14  0.08 
Ocean Spread  0.53  0.74  0.21  40%  0.13  0.06 
         
   
Rail Tariff  0.67  0.91  0.24  36%  0.12  0.13 
DCV  0.02  0.00  -0.03  -107%  0.07  0.07 
FSC  0.03  0.19  0.16  475%  0.01  0.04 
Rail Ship Cost  0.72  0.99  0.27  37%  0.16  0.26 
Ship Cost all 
modes  0.61  0.93  0.32  53%  0.26  0.36 
         
   
Margin  0.15  0.39  0.24  164%  0.18  0.36 
Gulf Port Spread  0.04  0.24  0.21  533%  0.04  0.08 
PNW Port Spread  0.16  0.36  0.21  129%  0.07  0.10 
*Changes for components of corn rail costs were derived through July 2010, which makes them not 
directly comparable to soybeans.  To be comparable, these were derived from 2004 to 2009 (Jan.-Oct. 
2009) and the changes were similar to those for soybeans.  Percentage changes in rail Tariff, DCV, FSC, 
and total rail cost were 25%, -138%, 289%, and 30%, respectively.
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Risk in Grain Marketing Functions 
Measures of risk were derived for each 
of the critical marketing functions (Table 
2).  In the case of soybeans, ranking the 
marketing functions in terms of risk 
(using the standard deviation) results in: 
ocean rates and spreads are most risky;  
followed by handling margins, barge 
costs, and then much lower are car 
values, rail tariffs and FSCs.  The risk in 
barge rates is greater than rail tariffs 
and total rail shipping costs.   
 
Table 2.  Means and Variability of Elements of Grain Marketing Functions ($/bu.) 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  CV  Min  Max 
Soybeans           
Rail Shipping  1.10  0.17  15  0.67  1.75 
Tariff  0.93  0.08  8  0.73  1.05 
DCV  0.03  0.13  402  -0.11  0.67 
FSC  0.14  0.06  43  0.02  0.27 
Barge  0.49  0.24  49  0.12  1.60 
Ocean Gulf to 
Japan 
1.70  0.75  44  0.63  3.62 
Ocean PNW 
to Japan 
1.07  0.48  45  0.36  2.36 
Ocean 
Spread 
0.62  0.33  53  0.22  1.66 
Spread  0.99  0.42  43  -0.49  3.31 
Margin  0.16  0.31  194  -1.00  2.76 
Corn           
Rail Shipping  0.93  0.26  28  0.33  1.64 
Tariff  0.79  0.17  22  0.40  1.05 
DCV  0.02  0.11  497  -0.11  0.63 
FSC  0.15  0.09  623  0.01  0.49 
Barge  0.43  0.27  62    1.41 
Ocean Gulf to 
Japan 
1.60  0.67  42  0.59  3.38 
Ocean PNW 
to Japan 
1.00  0.43  43  0.34  2.20 
Ocean 
Spread 
0.60  0.30  50  0.21  1.55 
Spread  1.08  0.47  44  0.04  2.78 
Margin  0.29  0.32  110  -1.44  1.52 
Gulf Port 
Spread 
0.14  0.14  101  -0.14  0.56 
PNW Port 
Spread 
0.31  0.24  75  -0.08  1.01 
 
 
Factors Impacting Intermarket 
Behavior   The regression results 
indicated the following variables were 
significant in explaining variability in 
origin basis values:  shipping costs, 
ocean rate spreads, outstanding export 
sales, concentration in the shipping 
industry, measures of rail cars late, the 
ratio or grain supplies to storage 
capacity, futures prices, and varying  
10 
 
measures of futures and destination 
spreads.  In addition, there are 
significant differences in these 
relationships across states.  While each 
variable has a specific interpretation, the 
results can be generalized in terms of 
relative importance.  The impacts of the 
most important variables are 
summarized below: 
 
Outstanding export sales:  This variable 
has a very strong and nonlinear impact 
on origin basis values.  Simply, strong 
export sales results in higher origin 
basis values.  A large amount of 
outstanding sales indicates there is a 
strong demand for shipments (i.e., as in 
a demand-pull market), and, vice versa.  
During periods of strong (weak) 
outstanding sales, the basis will be 
higher (weaker).  Interpretation of this 
relationship for soybeans is that an 
increase in outstanding sales from 
400,000 to 700,000 bushels would result 
in an increase in the basis from about  
$-0.42 to $-0.15/bu., which is fairly 
substantial (Figure 13).  In the case of 
corn, an increase in outstanding sales 
from 450,000 to 750,000 increases the 
origin basis from $-0.32 to $-0.17/bu., 
which is also substantial.  
Futures prices and spreads:  The results 
indicate that high futures prices are 
correlated with lower origin basis and 
large futures spreads result in lower 
origin basis values.  There is an inverse 
relationship between origin basis and 
futures values meaning that with high 
commodity prices, handlers are likely 
capable of capturing a greater margin.    
 
  The futures spread is the difference 
between deferred and nearby options 
and hence, it is included as an indicator 
of the returns to storage.  In normal 
markets, storage is encouraged which 
detracts from (competes with) shipping 
demand, and vice versa for inverted 
markets.  The sign is negative meaning 
that a larger positive spread, 
encourages storage.  Large carrying 
charges (as represented by the 
intermonth futures price differential) also 
result in a lower origin basis which 
would simultaneously provide reasons 
to store and not ship. 
 
Ratio of grain supplies to storage 
capacity:   The results indicate that tight 
capacity lowers origin basis values.  
Rail Cars late: There is a negative 
relationship between on-time rail car 
placements and origin basis.  The 
impact is relatively modest, and only 
slight for most observed levels of cars 
late.  See Figure 14. 
  For soybeans, this relationship is 
nonlinear.  For corn it is linear (at least 
over the observed range of the 
independent variable).  Increasing  
cars-late from 2000 to 3000, reduces 
the basis, on average, from about -
$0.50 to -$0.54/bu.  For corn, increasing 
the measure of cars-late from 2000 to 
3000 reduces the origin basis from -
$0.30 to -$0.32/bu.  Thus, rail on-time 
performance does have a negative 
impact of origin basis, but, considering 
all the other factors, this impact is 
relatively modest. 
 
Grain handling concentration:  The 
results indicate that basis at locations in 
states that have greater concentration 
have lower origin basis.  Increasing 
industry concentration has the impact of 
reducing origin basis.  For corn, 
increasing the Herfindahl from 900 to 
2000 has the impact of reducing the 
origin basis by about $0.02/bu.  For 
soybeans, increasing the CR4 from 40  
11 
 
to 80 has the impact of reducing the 
origin basis by about $0.07/bu. 
 
Figure 13.  Sensitivity of Origin Basis 
to Level of Outstanding Sales. Top 
Soybeans, Bottom Corn.   
 
Interpretation of origin basis values: 
Taken together, the results can be used 
to explain how these factors impact 
origin basis values.  During 2007-2008 
origin basis were quite low by historical 
and recent comparisons.  In contrast by 
later 2009 and 2010, the origin basis 





Figure 14.  Sensitivity of Origin Basis 
to BNSF Cars Late.Top Soybeans; 
Bottom corn.   
 
Reasons for the low basis during 
2007-2008 were a combination of these 
variable and qualitative comparisons 
between the periods are shown in Table 
3.  The weaker basis during 2007 (prior 
to the peak in February 2008) were 
caused by comparable weak export 
sales, wider carrying charges, large 
ocean rate spreads, and some lateness, 
though improved rail cars late.  In 
comparison in 2009/10, the basis has 
been increasing and likely caused by 
somewhat opposite behavior of these 




















































































































































Table 3:  Selected Variable Impacting Origin Basis Levels in 2007 vs. 2009/10.  
Variable  2007  2009/10 
Origin Basis  Weak  Strong 
  Factors having the Impact to 
Weaken/Strengthen the Basis 
During 2007 
Factors having the Impact to 
Weaken/Strengthen the Basis 
During 2009/10 
  Weaken  Strengthen  Weaken  Strengthen 
Outstanding sales  Weak    Strong   
Futures Prices   Lower    Higher   
Futures Spreads  Wider    Narrowing   
Ratio of grain 
stocks to storage 






Ocean Spreads    High  Lower   
Rail cars late  2000 cars late 
but decreasing 
    500 cars late, 
and 
improving 
Concentration  Varies geographically 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
  This study to analyzed some of the 
changes in the United States grain 
marketing system in the past decade, 
and how these may be impacting origin 
basis values.  Many changes have 
occurred in grain marketing and these 
have resulted in a very dynamic 
marketing system and changing market 
relationships.   
 
This study used very detailed data on 
origin and destination basis values over 
time for corn and soybeans.  It also 
assembled detailed data on marketing 
functions and costs for the same periods 
and origins, as well as a set of factors 
prospectively impacting these 
relationships.  The period of the study 
was weekly data from 2004 to 2009 for 
soybeans and mid-2010 for corn.  The 
major findings are summarized here.   
 
Changes in Exogenous Factors:  Over 
the last six years there have been 
important changes in factors that impact 
grain pricing and basis values.  Most 
important include: 
  Exports have changed in several 
dimensions.  Export levels have 
increased.  Second, the inter-weekly 
variability (an indicator or risk) in 
exports has increased.  And third, it 
appears exports have become more 
seasonally concentrated, particularly 
for soybeans.    
 
  Ocean rates have increased, and 
have become more volatile.  In 
addition, the US Gulf-PNW spread 
has increased, increasing demand 
for shipping to the PNW. 
 
  Rail car on-time performance has 
improved.  There were periods of 
shortages in 2004 and 2005 and in 
2008.  Since then, late car-
placement has improved 
substantially with the number of cars 
past due dropping to low values for 
much of late 2008, 2009 and 2010.  
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  Concentration in the grain handling 
has increased, and varies 
geographically.  Some regions are 
highly competitive.  However, some 
regions, notably in Western 
Nebraska and those in Illinois, have 
much greater concentration.   
 
  Storage capacity has become tighter 
in recent years.  Throughout most of 
the United States the ratio of grain 
stocks to storage capacity has 
increased which impacts inter-month 
price spreads, and the demand for 
shipping. 
 
Basis Behavior:  Origin basis values 
show geographical dispersions as 
expected.   
 
  Destination basis values behave 
similarly to some extent and are quite 
variable.     
 
  Basis risk has escalated in recent 
years.  Since 2007 the level of risk has 
increased substantially.  The destination 
basis is more volatile, at least in recent 
periods, than the origin basis. For corn, 
the volatility of the basis has also varied, 
but, to a lesser extent than the soybean 
basis.    
Marketing costs: The behavior of the 
major marketing costs and functions 
illustrate that all have increased through 
time, and are more volatile. Results of 
particular interest are: 
 
  Farm price as a function of market 
values:  The ratio of farm price to 
destination market price for 
soybeans decreased from 91 to 90% 
of the destination market value.  For 
corn, the average farm price ratio 
decreased from 77 to 73%.    
 
  Handling and trading margins have 
increased:  For soybeans, the 
implied margin increased from $0.18 
to $0.26/bu., or, by 47%.  For corn, 
the comparable margin increased 
from $0.15 to $0.39/bu., or by 164 
percent.  In addition the fobbing 
spread has increased.    
 
  Barge shipping costs increased by 
41% and 33%, respectively for 
soybeans and corn.  In comparison, 
rail tariff increases were comparable 




  Elements of rail shipping costs 
include the rail tariff, the FSC and 
daily car values.  The latter is not a 
source of revenue for the carrier, but, 
is a source of opportunity (or, 
replacement) cost for the initial 
buyers of the certificates. 
 
These results show that for 
soybeans, the changes were:  rail 
tariff increased $0.20/bu.; car values 
decreased by $0.05/bu.; and FSC 
increased $0.10/bu.  For corn, the 
changes were:  rail tariff +$0.24/bu.; 
car values $-0.03/bu.; and FSC 
increased $0.16/bu.   
   
Standard deviations for these are 
relatively modest and less than that 
for the other modes.   
 
Risk in grain marketing functions:  There 
is greater risk in barge and ocean 
shipping, than in rail.  The most risky 
functions are ocean rates and spreads, 
followed by handling margins, barge 
                                                       
4 These numbers are not strictly comparable as 
they were derived for different periods.  As noted 
above, they are comparable when compared 
over the same periods.  
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costs, and then much lower are rail car 
values, rail tariffs and FSCs.  Indeed, 
the risk in barge rates is greater than rail 
tariffs and total rail shipping costs.   
  Variability in secondary car values is 
important.  The results indicate that this 
variable has become more risky.  
However, risk in the primary market 
value for rail cars is virtually nil.  Thus, it 
is important that freight availability is 
guaranteed from the railroad (via its 
shuttle mechanism) at virtually nil 
premiums in the primary market.  This 
differs drastically from what is implied in 
secondary market values which are 
much more risky, and impacts shippers 
and growers in terms of basis. 
  Taken together these results indicate 
that 1) all marketing costs have 
increased; 2) the increase in rail tariffs 
were less than those for the other 
modes; 3) car values, on average 
declined;  4) FSC’s had moderate 
changes in absolute terms;  and 5) 
handling margins have had fairly 
substantial increases, particularly at 
port. 
 
Factors impacting origin basis  A 
regression model was estimated to 
evaluate the impact of specific variables 
on origin basis values.   
The following variables were 
significant in explaining variability in 
origin basis values:  shipping costs, 
ocean rate spreads, outstanding export 
sales, concentration in the shipping 
industry concentration, measures of rail 
cars late, the ratio or grain supplies to 
storage capacity, futures prices, and 
varying measures of futures and 
destination spreads.   
While each variable has a specific 
interpretation, the results can be 
generalized in terms of relative 
importance.  The impacts of the most 
important variables are summarized 
below: 
  Outstanding export sales:  This 
variable has a very strong and 
nonlinear impact on origin basis 
values.  Simply, strong sales results 
in higher origin basis values;   
 
  Futures prices:  High prices are 
correlated with lower origin basis and 
large futures spreads result in lower 
origin basis values;   
 
  Ratio of grain supplies to storage 
capacity: Tight capacity lowers origin 
basis values;  
 
  Concentration:  Basis values in 
states that have greater 





  Rail Cars late:  This impact is 
negative as expected, but the impact 
is relatively modest, and only slight 
for most observed levels of cars late;  
 
A few observations can be made from 
these results compared to some of the 
other recent studies on the role of 
transportation costs on grain pricing.  
First, it corroborates some of their 
conclusions, and validates others 
quantitatively.  The farmer share and 
change in farmer share of the market 
price is comparable.  In addition, each 
shows that the basis values have 
become more volatile.  The results 
quantify some of the factors alleged in 
the other studies.  One is that 
outstanding export sales have a very 
important impact on origin basis.   
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Simply, strong sales results in higher 
basis and vice versa.  Second, it 
quantifies the impacts of performance in 
rail car placements.  Where other 
studies highlighted this impact as being 
extremely important, these results 
indicate this impact is relatively more 
modest suggesting the impact is 
probably overstated in other studies.  
Finally, our study shows that other 
variables, notably storage capacity, 
futures prices and spreads, and industry 
concentration (also suggested in O’Neil 
Commodity Consulting) also impact 
origin basis. 
Another insinuation is made about 
the incidence of transport costs.  While 
others refer to that the farmer absorbs 
all changes in shipping costs, O’Neil 
Commodity Consulting suggests this 
varies through time depending on 
whether the market is demand-pull 
versus supply-push.  This is highly 
dependent on supply and demand 
elasticities, and these vary through time.  
Our results imply that the farmer 
absorbs about 30% (on average) of the 
change in shipping costs through lower 
origin basis values, though this varies 
through time and across origins.  It is 
expected that this would be less than 
1.0 as suggested by frequently used 
elasticities of supply and demand.  
Indeed, the data used in this study 
indicated there was substantial 
variability in the origin and destination 
basis. The origin basis decreased by a 
lesser amount than the increase in 
destination basis.  This indicates that 
changes in shipping and handling costs 
are reflected in lower prices to growers, 
and higher prices to buyers.  Thus, the 
grower is bearing less of the change in 
shipping costs in a demand-pull market, 
but, is bearing greater risk.    
Implications:  Several issues emerged 
in doing this study that will have future 
implications for the industry, policy 
makers and influencers.   
  One relates to the incidence of 
shipping costs and risks.  These results 
suggest that the grower absorbs a 
portion of the change in shipping costs.  
Increases (decreases) in exports 
increase (decreases) the origin basis.  
But, associated with this is greater 
volatility in the basis.  In demand-pull 
markets, the grower is bearing less of 
the shipping and handling costs, but, is 
bearing more of the volatility.  Thus, the 
growers need to become much more 
proficient in marketing.  
Second relates to rail car values.  
There are two aspects of this variable.  
It is clear that values observed in the 
secondary market are not a source of 
revenue to carriers.  Second, these 
values are highly volatile.  On average, 
their value in the primary market is 
essentially nil.  This indicates that freight 
availability is guaranteed from the 
railroad (via its shuttle mechanism) at 
virtually nil premiums in the primary 
market.  This differs drastically from 
what is implied in secondary market 
values which are much more risky, and 
impacts shippers and growers in terms 
of basis.  Nevertheless, the incidence of 
car value changes, and the volatility of 
this market function is an important 
issue for the industry.   
Third, relates to seasonal demands, 
capacity and pricing.  Changes in the 
world market place have essentially 
resulted in greater demands for shipping 
grains from the United States during 
more concentrated (shorter) shipping 
periods.  Indeed, growth in production 
and exports from contra-seasonal  
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countries, results in pressure in the 
United States for shipments to occur 
more seasonally. Issues related to this 
are compounded in that most logistics 
capacity virtually requires an annual 
commitment.    
Related to this is the impact of 
unexpected changes in demand on 
capacity and pricing.  It is important to 
acknowledge there is greater 
“peakedness”   in demand for shipping, 
and shipping requiring peak capacity.  
Current rail pricing mechanisms do not 
specifically address this problem.  At 
best is the daily car value but this affects 
shipper’s payoffs, and though it provides 
a signal to carriers, it does not impact 
their returns.  In other logistics 
industries, more elaborate mechanisms 
(e.g., priority pricing systems; 
reservation systems) have evolved to 
address these problems.   
Finally, the impacts and role of risk, 
forward coverage, and risk reducing 
mechanisms should escalate in 
importance.  Risk in most markets and 
marketing functions has escalated. 
These include greater volatility in 
agriculture markets (futures, basis, input 
costs, etc.), in addition to marketing 
functions (modal costs, availability, and 
margins).  Eventually, there will be 
challenges to develop mechanisms to 
mitigate these risks.  Producers can 
readily manage risks in futures 
(hedging) and basis variability (basis 
contracts) or through forward contracts.  
There are mechanisms for rail shipping, 
though not perfect, nor obvious (i.e., 
forward car coverage, hedging, FSC, 
etc.) to reduce risks.  Use of these is 
compounded when considering 
uncertainty of the size, timing and 
commitment of long-grain positions.   
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